Graham Spencer on paramilitary disbandment

Featured first by The Newsletter on 18th October 2024.

Many call for those organisations to disband but provide no real strategic approach for doing so beyond advocating a police crackdown.

Those whose lives are made miserable by others claiming to be from a loyalist paramilitary organisation have every reason to also demand better police action. But, for the longer term, a multi-layered approach to disbandment is required that is delivered outside the prevailing political structures. 

For that reason an independent international oversight commission – much like the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) - working with an independent international implementation commission is needed to move loyalist organisations towards deproscription and a collective commitment from the organisations to end all paramilitary structures.

The political parties in Northern Ireland seem unable to agree about talking to loyalist leaders, the British government is not interested and the Irish government is not able to participate to any great degree for obvious reasons. In the absence of a coherent approach, an independent international body offers the best way forward.

The need to confirm that paramilitarism no longer exists, that recruitment to paramilitary organisations has finished and a commitment to better education and social responsibility for loyalist communities is being pursued must be at the heart of a disbandment strategy.

Other factors also come into play, not least declining confidence in the stability of the Union and the apparent weakening of political unionism as part of that. Many in loyalist communities talk about living in fear of a united Ireland and threats to identity from an advancing republicanism. On top of this, the negativity and constant media emphasis on criminality understandingly leads many to think that most loyalists are somehow unworthy because of association with that stereotype.

Given this tendency, perhaps it is time for those in loyalist communities to seriously reflect on their attachment to the words ‘loyalist’ and ‘loyalism’ and start voicing a need for change through different identity categorisations such as pro-Union, unionist or British. In turn, the gap between unionism and loyalism needs to be closed and through that new space a more progressive and dynamic approach to social issues and individual responsibility can be communicated to inspire confidence and generate discussion about change.

As political parties become embroiled in argument about talking or not talking with loyalist leaders, the question needs to be asked: how real change is possible without talking. Certainly, the political parties benefit because they don’t have to deal with the thorny issue of engagement and the criminal gangs who use the cover of loyalist paramilitary organisations benefit because they can continue unchecked.

But it is the victims of crime within loyalist communities who most certainly benefit least and whose lives are made more miserable by sections of loyalist paramilitarism that wantonly exert threats, intimidation and violence upon them.

Fear within loyalist communities has turned from a conflict fear about republicans to a post-conflict fear of internalised anxiety and worry about identity. That climate tends to reproduce more fear and anxiety in the absence of a narrative about transformation and a Northern Ireland that serves all.

There are intelligent and articulate voices within loyalist communities struggling to get concerns raised against a sense of what many might see as self-inflicted misery. To see it in this way is a mistake. In response, it is important to generate enabling spaces (public events, community publications and professionally organised and run social media platforms) where negativity and criminality can be seriously challenged as dominant portrayals and where alternatives can be expressed.

A recent publication, The Ending of Loyalist Paramilitarism, highlights a number of areas such as the above that need to be addressed, both individually and as part of a convergent and coherent strategy to bring about change and end the unacceptable presence of paramiltarism. The authors provide a list of recommendations that give a framework for a new strategic approach to deal with and finally end loyalist paramilitary groups.

In the context of those recommendations two further points for consideration arise. First, a very significant majority of ex-combatants in loyalist organisations also want those organisations to become no more than commemorative bodies or agents for community development. And, second, it is estimated that some five to seven per cent attached to paramilitary organisations are involved in crime, so the overwhelming majority are not.

A more forceful policing approach is recommended with those engaged in criminality but the transformation of loyalist communities more widely also depends on cultivating relations with those who want change and supporting them as a persuasive force for good. To portray loyalism and loyalists through a criminal emphasis is a misrepresentation.

Communities are complex and a transformative approach to change must reflect and respond to that complexity. That is why a more formalised, serious and international approach to the issues is needed and why a multi-level, structured approach that is strategically focussed must be pursued if attitudes are to change and better communities are to emerge as a result.